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ELECTRICAL POWER COMMITTEE* 
Part I 
DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE CLEAN AIR AND 
CLEAN WATER ACTS 
A. Clean Air Act Developments 
Developments in 1978 under the Clean Air Act (CAA) 1 affecting electric 
utilities centered on rulemaking activity by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) implementing various major provisions of the 1977 Amend-
ments to the CAA. Those provisions involved, for example, air quality 
criteria and standards, prevention of significant deterioration (PSD), new 
source performance standards (NSPS), and nonattainment provisions. 
Other developments concerned the litigation resulting from that rulemaking 
activity and from EPA enforcement and other actions under the pre-1977 
regulation framework. 
1. Air Quality Criteria and Standards 
EPA is preparing to review its national ambient air quality standards 
(NAAQS) for sulfur oxides (SOx) and is moving to set short-term nitrogen 
dioxide (N02) ambient standards pursuant to requirements in the 1977 
Amendments2 to the CAA. As for SOx, EPA is updating its Air Quality 
Criteria Document for SOx. A National Academy of Science report de-
·This report is in four parts. Part I reviews the extensive developments during 1978 under 
the federal air and water pollution laws. Part II briefly considers other federal developments of 
significance to the electric power industry. Part III is an update of last year's review of 
developments concerning solar energy. Part IV consists of the 1978 reports from selected 
states. 
'42 U.S.c. §§ 7401-7642. 
'EPA is required by § 109(c) to set such ambient standards unless it finds, based on the 
short-term NO, air quality criteria it must develop, that there is "no significant evidence that 
such a standard for such a period is requisite to protect public health." 42 U.S.c. § 7409(c). 
9 
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signed to be a source document in this effort has just been published. 3 
EPA's November 30, 1978, Regulatory Agenda (November Regulatory 
Agenda) indicates that the EPA intends to issue any proposed revisions to 
the NAAQS for S02 by May 1980, and any final revisions by December 
1980.' 
As for the short-term N02 NAAQS, EPA was expected to propose a stan-
dard in late 1978 but did not do so by year-end. EPA's November 
Regulatory Agenda indicates that the agency intends to issue any proposed 
standards by January 1979, and final regulations by June 1979, although 
the actual date of proposal is more likely to be in the late spring or early 
summer.' These new standards, once promulgated, may well create new 
nonattainment areas requiring emission rollbacks for existing power sta-
tions and emission offsets for new power stations. 
EPA is also reviewing its NAAQS for particulates and plans to issue any 
proposed and final revisions by May and December 1980, respectively.6 
Previous litigation had established that the proper vehicle for forcing 
revision of EPA standards is a petition to EPA, followed by (1) a lawsuit in 
district court, if necessary to compel a response or (2) a lawsuit in the court 
of appeals (in those cases where review of the action in question normally 
lies in the court of appeals) to contest the merits of the response. 7 Several 
significant decisions were issued at the district court level in 1978. One 
ordered EPA to issue an NAAQS for lead by a date certain. 8 Another re-
fused on grounds of mootness to render a declaratory judgment that EPA 
had delayed unreasonably in responding to an oil industry petition for 
review and revision of the air quality criteria and NAAQS for 
photochemical oxidants once EPA had published (on June 9, 1978) a re-
vised criteria document and proposed amendments to the NAAQS.9 In a 
third case the district court ruled it has jurisdiction under the citizen suit 
provisions to require EPA to review its air quality criteria document for 
particulates. In its opinion the court noted that EPA's duty to review is 
mandatory but that its duty to revise is discretionary and that a failure to 
revise could only be challenged in a court of appeals. '0 
In an appellate case concerning attainment dates the Sixth Circuit ruled 
that Congress did not set a rigid mid-I97S attainment date for achieving 
'9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1772 (Cum. Dev.). 
'43 Fed. Reg. 56158. Consolidated Coal Co. petitioned EPA on January 17, 1978, to 
review and revise the NAAQS for SOx by doubling the SO, standards. 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 
1731-1732 (Cum. Dev.). 
'/d. 
old. The American Iron & Steel Institute has petitioned EPA to review and revise the 
NAAQS for particulates. 
'Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribes v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
'NRDC v. Costle, 12 E.R.C. 1422 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
'American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 12 E.R.C. 1509 (D.D.C. 1978). 
"American Iron & Steel Institute v. Costle, 12 E.R.C. 1008 (W.O. Pa. 1978). 
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NAAQS. II Hence a later date could be approved by EPA as long as it was 
no later than three years from the date of EPA approval of the state im-
plementation plan (SIP) or of a SIP revision. The court rejected a utility 
industry argument that EPA's approval of the new attainment date was in-
valid because attainment by that date was infeasible. The court cited Union 
Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection Agencyl2 for the proposition that 
the Administrator cannot reject a SIP on grounds of technological in-
feasibility. 
2. State Implementation Plans (SIP) 
Litigation concerning SIPs in 1978 has centered on the Ohio SIP's S02 re-
quirements. In Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agencyl) the Sixth Circuit upheld EPA's selection of a computer 
model (the Real-Time Air-Quality-Simulation Model or RAM) to establish 
the S02 emissions limitations for sources in urban areas in the EPA-
promulgated S02 provisions of the Ohio SIP. 14 This model was developed 
by EPA to produce individually calculated emission limitations necessary to· 
meet ambient standards, in response to petitioners' complaints that the 
"rollback" model, used in the initial Ohio SIP, failed to do so, resulting in 
unnecessary overcontrol. I' The court rejected petitioners' argument that its 
consultant, Enviroplan, had a more accurate model, because Enviroplan 
refused (on grounds of proprietary interest) to disclose the operative details 
of its model for EPA review and evaluation. 16 In the absence of such dis-
closure and evaluation, the court ruled that the Enviroplan model was not 
"available technology." I 7 
The court recognized that the record did not contain "positive proofs of 
the accuracy of RAM's predictions." 18 Even so, the court noted, after con-
sidering evidence bearing on the over and under prediction of RAM, that 
even if RAM did over predict, "such a conservative approach in protection 
of health and life was apparently contemplated by Congress in requiring 
that EPA plans contain 'emission limitations ... necessary to insure attain-
ment and maintenance.' "19 
"Northern Ohio Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1978). 
"427 U.S. 246 (1976). 
"572 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1978). 
"Ohio had never itself set SO, emissions limitations. Its initial SIP was set aside and 
remanded by the Sixth Circuit because EPA had not complied with the "notice and comment" 
rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act when granting its approval. 
Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973) (Buckeye Power I). Because of 
Ohio's long record of delay and default, the court refused to defer to the state's request that it 
reject the SIP provisions promulgated by EPA and rely on the state to develop SO, provisions 
in the future. 
"/d. at 1160. 
"/d. at 1163. 
"/d. 
"/d. 
"/d. at 1164 (emphasis added by the court). 
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The court also ruled that EPA did not need to allow cross-examination 
rights when promulgating the SIP provisions, since this rulemaking action 
was not required by the statute to be "on the record."20 The court noted 
that the Ninth Circuit had provided for cross-examination in its remand in 
Bunker Hill Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency.21 That case involved 
a "highly complex and technical issue concerning the technological infeas-
ibility of the use of sulfur burners to . . . control . . . lead smelter emis-
sions."22 Although the Sixth Circuit indicated that it might itself require 
cross-examination of an agency's experts in a proper case, it said that peti-
tioners in this case had had ample opportunity to participate fully, partic-
ularly in light of the court's prior remand in Buckeye Power Il2l to allow 
their further participation. 
In a follow-on case the Sixth Circuit upheld most aspects of the computer 
model (MAXT-24) which EPA chose for setting SIP emission limitations in 
rural and complex terrain areas. In particular it upheld EPA's refusal to use 
a widely recognized terrain adjustment factor for hilly terrain, the "half-
terrain height displacement theory." That theory was recommended by 
petitioners, a number of experts in the field, and had been used by EPA· 
itself in approving revisions to another SIP. 24 EPA had developed a dif-
ferent adjustment factor. While neither factor had been validated through 
field studies, and while the court expressly did not reject the petitioners' 
theory, it could not find the EPA choice arbitrary or capricious. The court 
also refused to reject the EPA model because it was not calibrated or 
because some actual monitor readings indicated that it overpredicted. B 
The court did, however, reverse EPA in one aspect of the modeling, the 
use of a certain coefficient for atmospheric stability conditions associated 
with gusty winds (Class A stability conditions) which was a critical assump-
tion in the case of one-third of the Ohio power plants being modeled. The 
coefficient had been judged unrealistic by experts in the field, including 
those attending a Specialists' Conference at the Argonne National 
Laboratory sponsored by EPA itself in February 1977. In the face of this 
apparent technical consensus, the court remanded the issue to EPA for fur-
ther study, despite the agency's argument that it was entitled to use the coef-
ficient until further studies could be done to substantiate the theories since 
there was, according to the agency, "no experimental or field data to justify 
'Old. at 1158-59. 
"572 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1977). 
"572 F.2d at 1160. The court also doubted the Bunker Hill court's view that an EPA-
promulgated SIP must be economically and technically feasible, noting that this was an open 
question after Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 261 n.7 (1976). The court said, in any 
case, that the record in the Cleveland Electric case showed no deficiency in that regard. /d. at 
1164. 
"Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 525 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1975). 
"Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F .2d 660 (6th Cir. 1978). 
"Id. at 665. 
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changing the dispersion curves or to determine how the dispersion equations 
should be changed. "26 
In a series of cases attempting to force SIP revisions27 the courts have 
held that district courts have jurisdiction under the citizen suit provisions to 
require that EPA make a decision on a requested SIP revision duty, but that 
they have no jurisdiction over the content of the decision. 28 While both 
courts found the section 304 citizen suit, the Mandamus Act, and the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA) grounds for jurisdiction easy to dispose 
of, on the question of district court review of the merits of an SIP revision 
decision, both struggled with the applicability of section 1331 federal ques-
tion jurisdiction. Each finally concluded that early intervention on the 
merits by a district court, before final agency action, would be inappro-
priate where Congress granted the courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction 
once that final action had occurred. 
In New England Legal Foundation v. Costle29 several nonprofit business 
and industry foundations and numerous Connecticut municipalities have 
brought a class action on behalf of all inhabitants of that state seeking to 
abate the effects in Connecticut of air pollutants emitted beyond the state's 
borders. The suit, which originally named representatives of EPA, the state 
of New York, the state of New Jersey, and Long Island Lighting Company 
(LILCO) as defendants, presents issues that are unique in several respects. 
This is one of the first environmental cases in which a plaintiff has com-
plained not only of adverse health and aesthetic effects of out-of-state emis-
sions but also of adverse economic effects. Connecticut businesses and in-
dustry are concerned that emissions from New York and Connecticut 
thwart Connecticut's economic growth by preventing emissions by Connec-
ticut industry and business of pollutants within limits established by EPA. 
In effect, the court is being asked to apportion among the states the right to 
pollute the air. 
Plaintiffs assert that New York and New Jersey have failed to promulgate 
and enforce implementation plans adequate to prevent adverse pollution ef-
fects in Connecticut. The suit requests that EPA be required to promulgate 
adequate plans for those states and to terminate federal grants to New York 
under the CAA. Plaintiffs further assert the violation of their Ninth 
26ld. at 663, quoting EPA's brief at 48-49. In related litigation, an Ohio state court ruled 
that variances to ambient air quality standards could not extend, under Ohio law, beyond the 
attainment date upheld in Northern Ohio Lung Ass'n, note 11, supra. Cleveland Electric Ill. 
Co. v. Williams, 12 E.R.C. 1081 (Ohio Court of Appeals, Franklin County Circuit, 1977). 
"See text accompanying note 6 supra for analogous cases involving attempts to require 
EPA review and revision of air quality criteria and standards. 
"Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Costle, 572 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1978) (one judge dissenting in 
part, essentially on the grounds that a nondiscretionary duty to revise, which is reviewable in 
district court, can arise if the agency's failure to do so is clearly wrong on the merits); Dow 
Chemical Co. v. Costle, 11 E.R.C. 2064 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (noting that until a state has taken 
all the necessary steps to present a complete SIP revision request to EPA, no suit lies in district 
court to require EPA to act at all). 
"No. H-78-414 (D. Conn., filed Aug. 9, 1978). 
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Amendment right to a clean environment and the CAA's abrogation of the 
Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses 
because of the inequality of its effects among states. 
Of equal interest to utilities is the plaintiffs' federal common law 
nuisance claim seeking to enjoin LILCO from burning high-sulfur fuel. 
This claim will at least partially determine, for the first time, the ~'elation­
ship between the federal common law of nuisance and the CAA pursuant to 
which LILCO has received the approval of both New York and EPA to 
burn the high-sulfur fuel. LILCO has argued, inter alia, that the CAA 
preempts the federal common law of nuisance and that only a state has 
standing to assert such a claim. 
3. Prevention oj Significam Deterioration (PSD) 
EPA published its final PSD regulations on June 19,1978,30 and they were 
promptly appealed by both industry and environmental groups.31 Even 
before their promulgation, litigation had begun concerning their "effective 
date." The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
consolidated all of the related PSD litigation and divided it, for purposes of 
briefing, into two phases-phase one involving the "effective date" issues 
and phase two involving the remaining procedural and substantive issues. 
The phase one issues were briefed and argued first, in the fall of 1978. 
EPA had chosen to apply its new regulations as of March 1, 1978, a choice 
supported by the utility industry litigants. Other industry groups argued 
that the new rules could not be made effective until states revised their SIPs 
by July 1, 1979. Environmental groups argued that Congress intended the 
provisions of the new regulations to apply as of August 7, 1977, the date of 
enactment of the Amendments. 
The initial briefs in phase two of the litigation were submitted in mid-
December, 1978. A wide range of issues was raised. Various industry peti-
tioners argued that: 
1. ThePSD increments were not intended by Congress to be enforced 
like ambient standards and were i.mproperly promulgated. 
2. The PSD baseline determination date was supposed to be the date of 
the first PSD application in an area, not August 7, 1977, the date of 
enactment of the 1977 Amendments. 
3. While the statute directs the use of fictitious stack heights for a plant 
at the time it is licensed, EPA cannot-
(a) use fictitious stack heights to calcUlate the amount and location 
of PSD increment consumption by other sources at the time of 
initial PSD licensing of the plant, nor can it 
'°43 Fed. Reg. 26380. 
"For a detailed discusion of the evolution of the PSD provisions of the 1977 Clean Air Act 
Amendments and of EPA's response to them, see the Joint Statement of the Case by Industry 
Petitioners in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, Nos. 78-1006 and consolidated cases (D.C. Cir.). 
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(b) use fictitious stack heights to calculate later the actual amount 
and location of PSD increment consumption by the plant itself. 
4. EPA should not have required use of a boiler-by-boiler approach to 
its "commenced construction" rules and should not have required 
that construction commence on each phase of a multiunit project 
within 18 months of the projected and approved commencement date 
for the phase in question. 
5. EPA improperly failed in its final PSD regulations to respond to 
criticism during the comment period of its Proposed Criteria for Ac-
ceptable Air Quality Modeling. 
6. EPA improperly defined "potential to emit" with reference to un-
controlled, rather than controlled emissions. 
7. EPA improperly defined "major emitting facilities" by including 
operations, mobile sources and temporary sources, and by improper-
ly including aggregations of minor emissions points. 
8. EPA improperly included operations producing fugitive dust such as 
mines, farms, forests, and oil fields within its "major emitting 
facilities" definition, and even if these sources are properly included, 
EPA's regulations are arbitrary for various reasons. 
9. EPA should have provided that a "major modification" occurs 
under the Act only where the modification increases net emissions. 
10. EPA should have included fuel switches within the baseline, so that 
they did not consume the increments. 
II. EPA should not have applied the PSD requirements to pollutants 
other than S02 and particulates. 
12. The PSD permit process should have been limited to sources located 
in clean air areas and should not have been extended to sources 
located in "nonattainment areas." 
13. EPA should not have included a visible emission standard in "best 
available control technology" (BACT) requirements. 
The Sierra Club and the Environmental Defense Fund argued that: 
(I) EPA had improperly exempted certain stationary sources (those involving 
use of the "bubble concept," those with the potential to emit less than 50 
tons per year, and fugitive dust sources) from full preconstruction PSD 
review. 
(2) EPA should have required one year's monitoring data for all pollutants 
regulated by the Clean Air Act in order to determine compliance with PSD 
increments (not just for pollutants for which there exists a national ambient 
air quality standard and then only for determination of compliance with the 
ambient standards) and has failed, within one year of the enactment of the 
1977 Amendments (as the Amendments required), to promulgate regula-
tions detailing conditions under which less than one year's monitoring is 
adequate. 
(3) Ex parte influence by the President and his advisors rendered the 50-ton and 
fugitive dust exemptions illegal. 
(4) The provisions for revision of SIPs are inadequate to ensure maintenance of 
the PSD increments. 
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EPA is currently moving toward new rules for the industry's petitioners 
first point concerning the promulgation of PSD increments for pollutants 
other than S02 and total suspended particulates (proposal by December 
1979, and final promulgation by October 1980, according to EPA's Nov-
ember Regulatory Agenda). 
4. Nonattainment Area Requirements 
EPA adopted its final emission offset policy for use in nonattainment areas, 
without any further comment period, on January 16, 1979. 32 Some items 
were left open for further comment. 33 
EPA's policy governs applications for certain new sources in nonattain-
ment areas submitted before July 1, 1979, or within the time allowed for 
development of a revised SIP for areas designated nonattainment after the 
initial designations under section 107. For permit applications submitted 
after those dates, the provisions of the revised state SIP will govern if the 
SIP meets the nonattainment requirements (Part D) of the CAA. If the SIP 
does not meet these requirements, the source may not be constructed at all, 
with the exception of cases where the only nonattainment impact is across a 
state line, in which case the EPA policy applies. 
5. Steam-Electric New Source Performance Standards 
Proposed new source performance standards (NSPS) for SOlt TSP, and 
NO, were announced on September 19, 1978. J4 EPA is considering a 
number of alternatives, including EPA Staff recommendations, certain 
Department of Energy (DOE) options and industry proposals. Since final 
regulations (anticipated by March 1979) will be applicable retroactively to 
the date of publication of the EPA notice, the notice sets forth the 
regulatory text of the most stringent proposals (those of the EPA Staff) in 
order to notify industry of the most severe requirements to which it might 
be subject. 
The EPA Staff, DOE, and industry proposals are as follows: 
1. The EPA Staff proposed 85 percent removal of S02 emissions regard-
less of input sulfur with a 0.2 Ibs/MBTU floor. (Compliance would be 
monitored based on a 24-hour average of emissions with three daily ex-
emptions per month, none below 75 percent.) The standard for par-
ticulates would be 0.03 Ibs/MBTU, and for NO" 0.6 and 0.5 lbsl 
MBTU for bituminous and sub-bituminous coals, respectively. 
2. DOE proposed 85 percent removal of S02 but with a floor of 0.8 
Ibs/MBTU. (Compliance would be based on a 3~-day average of emis-
sions.) The particulate standard would be 0.05 to 0.08 Ibs/MBTU. 
"44 Fed. Reg. 3274. 
"[d. at 3298. 
"43 Fed. Reg. 42154. 
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3. The industry proposed a sliding scale for percentage removal ranging 
from 20 percent to 85 percent depending upon the sulfur content of the 
coal burned. (Compliance would be based on a 30-day average of 
emissions.) Particulate emissions limits would be 0.08 Ibs/MBTU, and 
NOx limits would remain at 0.7 Ibs/MBTU. 
Continuous monitoring requirements are part of the proposed NSPS. There 
is also a separate continuous monitoring rulemaking underway for existing 
sources. JS 
6. Tall Stack Regulations 
EPA published proposed rules implementing the "good engineering prac-
tice" (GEP) provisions of section 123 of the 1977 Amendments on January 
12, 1979. 36 These regulations establish a defined "GEP" stack height as the 
maximum stack height for which a source may be given credit in establish-
ing its emission limitation in the applicable SIP. The November Regulatory 
Agenda lists April 1979 as the target date for final tall stack regulations. 
7. Visibility Protection Guidelines 
EPA is required, by section 169A of the 1977 Amendments, to prepare a 
report to Congress on "Visibility Protection," but has not yet done so. On 
February 8, 1978, the Department of the Interior identified virtually all 
mandatory Class I federal areas as areas "where visibility is an important 
value."37 By October 1979 EPA plans to publish proposed guidelines for 
application by state SIPs of "best available retrofit technology" (BART) to 
certain major stationary sources. 38 These guidelines are to be in final form 
by August 1980. J9 Under section 169A(c) fossil-fuel fired generating power 
plants with a total generating capacity in excess of 750 megawatts may be 
exempted from these requirements if they can demonstrate that they do not 
and will not, by themselves or in combination with other sources, "emit any 
air pollutant which may reasonably be anticipated to cause or contribute to 
significant impairment of visibility in any such area." 
8. Toxic Substance Regulations 
In Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States40 the Supreme Court held that 
"work practice" rules promulgated under the hazardous air pollutant pro-
visions of section 112 of the CAA are not "emission standards" under that 
section since emission standards must be set on a quantitative basis. In so 
doing, it rejected the government's argument that section 307(b)(2) of the 
"See November Regulatory Agenda, 43 Fed. Reg. at 56163. 
"44 Fed. Reg. 2608. 
3743 Fed. Reg. 7721 (Feb. 24, 1978). 
"November Regulatory Agenda, note 35 supra. 
"Id. 
'°434 U.S. 275 (1978), II E.R.C. !O81. 
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CAA, \yhich prohibits review in an enforcement proceeding of section 112 
emission standards, precludes the defendant in a criminal enforcement ac-
tion from asserting as a defense that the section 112 "emission standard" 
alleged to be violated is not an emission standard within the meaning of the 
CAA. 
9. Enforcement 
Adamo Wrecking4l held that section 307(b)(2) does not bar the defense that 
the section 112 emission standard being enforced is not an emission stan-
dard within the meaning of the CAA. 
While the courts have generally held that preenforcement review of 
notices of violation and enforcement orders is not available, a district court 
in Philadelphia recently allowed review of a notice of violation (NOV).42 In 
a narrow opinion, the court found federal question jurisdiction over a suit 
filed to have a preexisting consent order declared valid and an EPA-issued 
NOV declared illegal. The court distinguished West Penn Power Co. v. 
Train43 and assumed jurisdiction because (1) the issuance of the NOV con-
stituted final agency action since the CAA Amendments require that once 
this occurs an enforcement action must follow, and (2) the legality of the 
consent order raises legal issues appropriate for judicial review. 
Courts have generally refused to stay enforcement of SIP provisions 
pending exhaustion of state appellate processes challenging the promulga-
tion of the SIP. Yet, in Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection 
Agency" a district court allowed preenforcement review and stayed EPA 
enforcement of violations of S02 emission limitations while the plaintiff in 
good faith sought a variance under state procedure. 
10. Judicial Review 
In Adamo Wrecking the Supreme Court reaffirmed that section 307(b)(2) 
precludes a court from undertaking full review of the procedural or sub-
stantive validity of a rule subject to that section during criminal enforce-
ment proceedings. In other litigation, a district court dismissed a petition of 
the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) challenging EPA's PSD regula-
tions under the citizen suit provisions, holding that final PSD regulations 
are reviewable in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia under section 307(b)(I).4s In Amoco Oil Co. v. United States 46 a 
district court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 133 I (a) over a 
"Id. 
"Philadelphia Electric v. Costle, No. 78-4170 (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 27, 1978). 
"522 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1975). 
"450 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mo., Mar. 16, 1978). This case was recently reversed by the 
Eighth Circuit. Slip Op. No. 78-1357 (8th Cir. 1979). 
"Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 448 F. Supp. 89 (D.D.C., 1978), 11 E.R.C. 
2073, appeal pending. 
"450 F. Supp. 185, 11 E.R.C. 1693 (W.D. Mo. 1978). 
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challenge to the agency's interpretation of an otherwise valid section 211 
regulation. The court recognized that an attack on the validity of the regula-
tion is reviewable only in a court of appeals. 
B. Clean Water Act (CW A) Developments 
1. Effluent Limitations Guidelines 
The EPA continued its development of thermal effluent limitations guide-
lines during 1978 in response to the courts remand order in Appalachian 
Power Co. v. Train. 47 Development regulations under section 403(c) setting 
ocean discharge criteria is also proceeding slowly. The November Regula-
tory Agenda estimates proposed regulations by April 1979, and final regula-
tions by December 1979. The EPA also continued its review of "best 
available technology" (BAT) requirements and effluent limitations 
guidelines for toxic substances for the steam-electric category pursuant to 
the settlement agreement in National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. 
Train. 48 The November Regulatory Agenda lists proposed regulations in 
May 1979 and final regul~tions in December 1979. 
There were new developments in the National Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Train (now National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle) 
litigation. NRDC filed a motion, on September 26, 1978, to "show cause" 
why EPA should not be held in contempt of court for allegedly failing to 
comply with four paragraphs of the settlement agreement. NRDC also re-
quested that the settlement agreement be significantly modified in several 
respects. EPA responded, justifying in detail its actions under the settle-
ment agreement, and intervenors responded, moving to vacate the June:8, 
1976, consent decree on the ground that it had been superseded by the tox-
ic's regulatory program in the 1977 Amendments to the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act (1977 Amendments). After negotiations between 
NRDC and EPA and comments by intervenors, NRDC and EPA filed a 
Joint Motion for Modification of Settlement on December 15, 1978. The 
Joint Motion adopted the new rulemaking schedule advocated by EPA and 
adopts new language (1) concerning a program for pretreatment regulations 
for pollutants other than the sixty-five listed in the 1977 Amendments; and 
(2) relating to promulgation of water quality standards. Intervenors filed an 
opposition to the Joint Motion, arguing that the 1977 Amendm~nts 
superseded the consent decree and that modification of the decree as pro-
posed by EPA and NRDC would violate the rulemaking and 'public par-
ticipation requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, tii~ CW A, 
- • t \ 
EPA Regulations, and the Due Process Clause. The settlement agreement 
continues to reserve to the parties the right to later litigate the validity of 
any programs required by it. .. 
"545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976). 
"S E.R.C. 2120 (D.D.C. 1976). 
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Appalachian Power Co. v. Train49 required EPA to promulgate new 
"best practical technology" (BPT) variance regulations for the steam-elec-
tric category. In March 1978, EPA finally proposed an "amendment" to its 
steam-electric BPT variance provision, in order to implement the court's 
order.50 The only changes proposed were (I) a statement that the August 20, 
1974, opinion of EPA's.General Counsel, that costs could not be considered 
under its standard variance clause, would not apply to power plants; and (2) 
a new interpretation of the phrase "other such factors" to include "signifi-
cant cost differentials and the factors listed in section 301(c) of the Act." 
EPA's final rule was virtually identical to its March proposal. H EPA re-
jected industry comments suggesting that its proposed regulation was incon-
sistent with the Appalachian Power decision because it failed to include all 
of the section 304(b)(I)(B) factors as required by that decision, specifically 
"total cost ... in relation to effluent reduction benefits." The agency also 
rejected NRDC comments that the factors listed in section 301(c) concern-
ing economic capability in granting variances to the BA T requirements 
could not be considered in the BPT variance provision. The resulting litiga-
tion was transferred to and consolidated in the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit and is pending. 52 In addition to the issues raised 
during the comment period, NRDC argues that section 301(1) of the Clean 
Water Act forbids the application ofthe BPT variance to effluent limitation 
regulations for toxic pollutants. 
The EPA debated internally during 1978 whether a "bubble policy" 
should be applied to BAT, BCT, BPT, and water quality standards. 53 
In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle54 the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit upheld effluent limitations guidelines regulations for the 
pulp and paper industry. The court dealt extensively with the proper scope 
of review of EPA action, adopting a differential stance on factual or 
"policy" determinations, a less differential stance on issues of statutory in-
terpretation, and a relatively independent stance on procedural issues. The 
court ruled that receiving water quality is not a permissible consideration in 
"545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976). 
'°43 Fed. Reg. 8812-13 (1978). In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Train, No. 74-2366 (4th 
Cir., filed July 14, 1978) Commonwealth Edison, a petitioner in Appalachian Power Co. v. 
Train, note 49, supra, petitioned the court to enforce its Appalachian Power mandate ordering 
EPA to promulgate a valid BPT variance clause and to enjoin EPA enforcement actions until 
EP A had complied with the mandate, had allowed petitioner to present a variance request, and 
had acted on that request. By order dated August 28, 1978, the court denied this petition 
without prejudice to its later renewal. 
"43 Fed. Reg. 43023 (Sept. 22, 1978). 
"Appalachian Power Co., et al. v. Costle, No. 74-2096, and consolidated cases. Similar 
arguments are already before the Fourth Circuit in another pending case, Consolidated Coal 
Co. v. Costle, No. 76-1690 (4th Cir., filed Aug. 10, 1976). 
"The various proposals are described at 9 ENVIR. REP. (Current Developments) 1643-44 
and reprinted 9 id at 1659-1665. 
"11 E.R.C. 2149 (D.D.C. 1978). 
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setting effluent limitations guidelines, since the phrase "effluent reduction 
benefits" means those reductions in effluent discharge that occur "when-
ever less effluent is discharged, i.e., whenever a plant treats its waste before 
discharge." By so doing, the court effectively read cost-benefit balancing 
out of the Clean Water Act. 
The Weyerhaeuser case also upheld the BPT variance regulations for the 
paper industry by finding that they could "be applied with enough flexibil-
ity to support the general rulemaking effort." The court took no position 
on the application of the variance clause in specific cases, nor on its precise 
interpretation. It read the BPT variance requirement to mean that a vari-
ance need only be granted where' 'the entire impact of a limitation on an in-
dividual mill exceeds that which the EPA is authorized to place on the in-
dustry. "ll It ruled that "local receiving water quality" cannot be con-
sidered when granting variances. Finally, it ruled that while "total cost'" 
must be considered in granting BPT variances, "the difficulty, or in fact the 
inability, of the operator to absorb the costs need not control the variance 
decision," indicating that it reached that conclusion "only after satisfying 
[itself] that the legislative intent is as clear as the result is harsh." 
In Republic Steel v. Costle' 6 the Sixth Circuit overruled its previous deci-
sion in Republic Steel v. Train l7 where it had granted an extension of the 
1977 BPT deadline because of EPA's failure to promulgate final BPT regu-
lations on a timely basis. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Court 
held that section 309(a)(5)(B) of the amended CW A establishes the only 
mechanism for granting BPT deadline extensions. 
2. Section 311 Hazardous Substance Regulations 
EPA promulgated hazardous pollutant regulations under section 311 on 
March 13, 1978. These regulations were set aside by district court in 
Manufacturing Chemists Ass'n v. Costle" on three grounds: 
1. EPA exceeded its authority in attempting to regulate point source 
discharges under section 311 where the discharger possesses an 
NPDES permit; 
2. The manner in which EPA established harmful quantities was incon-
sistent with statutory criteria; and 
3. EPA's determination that 261 of the 271 designated hazardous sub-
stances are not removable was arbitrary and capricious. 
EPA subsequently moved to stay the provisions of the district court's deci-
sion relating to reporting under section 311, but this motion was denied. '9 
"Id. at 2165, n.34. 
"_ F.2d _, II E.R.C. 2041 (6th Cir. 1978). 
"557 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1977). 
"451 F. Supp. 902, II E.R.C. 1792 (W.O. La. 1978). 
"Manufacturing Chemists Ass'n Y. Costie, 12 E.R.C. 1327 (W.O. La. 1978). 
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Congress then adopted amendments to section 311 which clarified the 
relationship between that section and the National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit provisions of the CW A. As stated by 
Senator Muskie, on the one hand, "chronic discharges" associated with 
manufacturing and treatment technology are to be regulated under sections 
402 and 309. On the other hand, "classic spill" situations occurring at a 
facility with an NPDES permit will be subject to section 311, once EPA has 
promulgated new regulations under that provision. In addition, the amend-
ments simplify the standards for setting harmful quantities and for assess-
ing penalties under section 311. Significantly, they provide for the recovery, 
under section 309(b), of clean-up costs incurred in connection with a 
discharge excluded from section 311 by the new NPDES exception. 
Four cases in 1978 dealt with liability for clean-up costs under section 
311. In United States v. MIY Big Sam60 the court held that limitations on 
liability for clean-up costs under section 311 do not preclude the govern-
ment from maintaining a suit under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 to 
recover clean-up costs in excess of the section 311 liability limits. In Tug 
Ocean Prince v. United States 6 ' the court reversed a finding by the district 
court that the oil spill in question resulted from errors of navigation and 
management on board the tug and not from matters within the tugboat 
owner's privity and knowledge. The court found that the tugboat owner 
had failed to supervise properly the operation of the boat (by its failure to 
require a lookout, failure to designate a captain, and failure to inform the 
pilot of the copilot's unfamiliarity with the river) and that these omissions 
constituted "willful misconduct" ~ithin the meaning of section 311(f)(1). 
Thus, the court found that the district court erroneously limited the tugboat 
owner's clean-up cost liability under section 311(f)(1). In a third case62 the 
Fourth Circuit followed United States v. LeBeou! Bros. Towing Co., Inc. 63 
and rejected a corporation's argument that civil penalties under section 311 
are criminal in nature and that its notification to the government of the spill 
was entitled to "use immunity" under section 1321(b)(5). The court ruled 
that a corporation is not entitled to the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination and that the scope of "use immunity" under section 
31l(b)(5) was intended to extend only to criminal cases, not to penalties 
specifically denominated by Congress as "civil penalties." One judge, in a 
brief concurrence, noted that "different considerations might well arise in 
the application of [these provisions] to an individual as contrasted to a cor-
poration. "64 Finally, a district court upheld imposition of substantial, as 
'°454 F. Supp. 1144. II E.R.C. 1741 (E.D. La. 1978). 
"12 E.R.C. 1010 (2d Cir. 1978). 
"United States v. Allied Towing Co., 578 F.2d 978, 12 E.R.C. 1305 (4th Cir. 1978). 
"537 F.2d 149,9 E.R.C. 1118 (5th Cir. 1976). 
"United States v. Marathon Pipeline Co., II E.R.C. 1437 (E.D. Ill. 1978) affirmed, 12 
E.R.C. 1588 (7th Cir. 1978). 
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opposed to nominal, section 311(b)(6) penalties on a pipeline owner for a 
rupture and oil spill caused by a third party, notwithstanding defendant's 
lack of fault. 6l 
3. Water Quality Criteria, Standards, and Planning 
EPA is required by the settlement agreement in Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. Train 66 to develop water quality criteria for the sixty-five 
toxic pollutants listed there. EPA actively circulated draft criteria docu-
ments during 1978 and the industry commented on these. The November 
Regulatory Agenda indicates that criteria for twenty-nine of these are to be 
proposed in March 1979, for final adoption by September 1979. The re-
maining thirty-six criteria are to be proposed in July 1979, and adopted by 
December 1979. 
On May 18, 1978, EPA proposed new guidelines containing a new meth-
odology for deriving water quality criteria for the protection of aquatic 
life. 67 Those guidelines were not further proposed or finally adopted during 
1978. 
On July 10, 1978, EPA published a statement describing its current policy 
regarding state water quality standards under section 303 of the Act and an 
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on this question. 68 The three 
major changes the EPA proposed to its policy were (1) adoption of more 
stringent criteria which must be met before water quality use designations 
can be "downgraded"; (2) intensification of EPA efforts to encourage 
states to "upgrade" use designations; and (3) requiring that state water 
quality standards be promulgated for specified pollutants. EPA's 
November Regulatory Agenda indicates that final implementing regulations 
on these policy issues were due to be proposed in late 1978 and published in 
final form in early 1979, although no action was taken in 1978 and none has 
been taken to date in 1979. 
EPA's proposed tightening of its water quality standards policy may have 
been at least partially influenced by the case of Stream Pollution Control 
Board v. Alexander. 69 There the court concluded that the Administrator has 
authority under section 303(c)(4)(B) to promulgate federal water quality 
standards at any point in time when the Administrator determines that a 
state's standards do not measure up to the requirements of the CW A. The 
court denied plaintiff's request for a preliminary and permanent injunction 
restraining EPA from promulgating, pursuant to section 303(c)(4), federal 
water quality standards to supersede portions of the state's standards dis-
approved by EPA pursuant to section 303(c)(3). In dictum, the court con-
cluded that the 90-day review period under section 303(c)(3) begins to run 
·'United States v. Texas Pipeline Co .• II E.R.C. 1465 (E.D. Okla. 1978). 
··8 E.R.C. 2120 (D.D.C. 1976). 
·'43 Fed. Reg. 21506 (1978). 
·'43 Fed. Reg. 29588-29592 (I978) . 
• '_ F. Supp. _. II E.R.C. 1564 (S.D. Ind. 1978). 
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only when the state has submitted all relevant information and not simply 
from the date when the state first submits its standards. 
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle70 the district court held that 
EPA has a duty, in the absence of state action, to implement the load anal-
ysis provisions of sections 303(d)(I) and (2) of the CWA. The court also 
noted that in doing so, EPA would have to comply with section 102(2)(E) of 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by preparing an Environ-
mental Impact Statement (EIS) which studies, develops, and describes alter-
native methods of controlling salinity, despite the provisions of section 
511(c)(I), since the latter section relieves EPA only from the EIS require-
ment of section 102(2)(C) of NEPA.71 
On September 20, 1978, EPA published a notice72 proposing an identifi-
cation of pollutants suitable for total maximum daily load (TMDL) calcula-
tions pursuant to section 304(a)(2)(D) of the CWA. The EPA took this ac-
tion in response to a court order in Board of County Commissioners of 
Calvert County v. Costle. 73 On December 28, 1978, EPA published a final 
notice identifying all pollutants, under proper technical conditions, as being 
suitable for the calculation of total maximum daily loads. Each state was re-
quired, within 180 days after publication of the notice, to submit its first 
identification of waters requiring TMDLs and its first load calculations. 
In pending litigation several utility companies have appealed a district 
court decision finding that EPA regulations" establishing an antidegrada-
tion policy under the CW A were not ripe for review and that the electric 
utility company plaintiffs, who were within the class regulated by the anti-
degradation requirement, lack standing. The appellants also asked the court 
to decide whether section 308 or section 303, the purported authority for the 
challenged regulations, authorize EPA to pursue an anti degradation 
policy.7S 
4. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) Program 
EPA undertook wholesale reorganization and reform of its NPDES pro- . 
cedural rules in 1978. It circulated drafts of its proposed revisions in Feb-
ruary and March. On January 6 the EPA proposed specific revisions con-
cerning (1) implementation of the priority pollutants settlement agreement 
requirements; and (2) EPA review of state-issued permits. 76 On May 23, 
1°439 F. Supp. 980, 12 E.R.C. 1131 (D.D.C. 1978). 
11 [d. at 1134. 
"43 Fed. Reg. 42303. 
"No. 78-0572 (D.D.C.). 
1440 C.F.R. § 130.17, dealing with water quality, which provides that "[e)xisting instream 
water uses shall be maintained and protected" and that "[n)o further water quality degrada-
tion ... is allowable." 
"Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Train, No. 77-1612 (7th Cir., filed May 25, 1977). The 
case has been briefed and argued, but there has been no decision to date. 
"43 Fed. Reg. 1256-58 (197·8). 
HeinOnline -- 12 Nat. Resources Law. 25 1979
ANNUAL REVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT ACTlVITIES-1978 25 
1978, EPA promulgated these regulations in finaUorm77 and on the same 
day proposed to amend them to ensure that holders of NPDES permits 
issued in the near future take the steps necessary to comply with the July 1, 
1984, BAT deadline for toxic pollutants in the event that no " final [BAT] 
regulations" trigger the permit reopener provisions. The proposed amend-
ment provided for two alternative types of NPDES permits where permits 
had to be issued before September 30, 1980 for the steam-electric industry: 
(1) short-term permits which must expire by September 30, 1980, at which 
time new permits incorporating schedules for compliance with case~by-case 
BAT limitations for toxics must be issued if no final regulations are in ef-
fect;78 and (2) long-term permits issued for the usual five-year term in-
cluding case-by-case BAT limitations for toxics and BCT limitations and 
schedules of compliance for meeting them. These proposed regulations were 
made final on December 11, 1978.79 
On August 21, 1978, EPA published proposed new NPDES procedural 
regulations. 80 It also published "Interim Final Regulations Implementing 
sections 30I(c) and 30I(g) of the Act."81 EPA also published (1) proposed 
regulations governing Spill Prevention and Control Countermeasure 
(SPCC) plans to prevent discharges of hazardous substances from industrial 
facilities; and (2) proposed regulations implementing section 304(e) of the 
Act establishing "Criteria and Standards for Imposing Best Management 
Practices for Ancillary Industrial Activities. "82 The EPA also plans to 
issue, but has not yet proposed, regulations governing the substantive 
criteria for section 301(c) and section 301(g) variances from BAT re-
quirements. 
EPA's NPDES procedural reform regulations are far-reaching in nature 
and were extensively commented on by industry and others during the com-
ment period. They are expected to be promulgated in final form by early 
1979. 
On November 16 EPA issued public notice of a draft policy guidance 
concerning NPDES permit requirements for solid waste disposal facilities in 
waters of the United States. 83 This EPA policy, if made final, could be in-
terpreted to require utilities to obtain NPDES permits for ash ponds and 
scrubber sludge facilities located in wetlands84 or in impounded "intermit-
"43 Fed. Reg. 22160. 
"Of course, if final SAT regulations for toxics have been published before a short-term 
permit expires, the permit would already have been modified, through operation of its 
reopener provision, to incorporate. these regulations before September 30, 1980. 
1943 Fed. Reg. 58066. 
,old. at 37078. 
"43 Fed. Reg. 40859 (Sept. 13, 1978). 
"43 Fed. Reg. 39276-84 (Sept. I, 1978). 
"43 Fed. Reg. 53495. 
"On January 5, 1979, EPA issued a "Statement of Procedures" on floodplain manage-
ment and wetlands protection. 44 Fed. Reg. 1455. 
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tent" or "wet weather" streams or depressions, where the facilities receive 
wastes from trucks or other vehicles. No permit would be granted where 
there are practicable alternatives which (1) do not involve a discharge into 
"waters of the United States" (broadly defined in EPA's existing and pro-
posed procedural regulations) or (2) could be conducted in a manner less 
damaging to the affected aquatic ecosystem. 
The applicant would have the burden of carrying out a study of all possible 
alternatives\ On December 27, 1978, the National Wildlife Federation 
(NWF) petitioned EPA for rulemaking on this subject, asking that EPA-
1. define solid waste disposal as a discharge subject to the NPDES permit 
program; 
2. issue effluent limitation guidelines for the solid waste disposal point 
source category; and 
3. regulate these activities by permit under section 402. 
The NWF urges EPA. to adopt a "zero discharge" approach in light of 
alternative means of disposal such as upland sanitary landfills, incineration, 
and resource recovery. EPA has taken no action to date. 
By letter dated February 28, 1978, the NWF filed a "Petition for 
Rulemaking Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act" in which i~ 
requested that EPA regulate hydroelectric dams as a point source category 
under sectipn 402(a) of the CW A. The petition, listing-
1. low concentrations of dissolved oxygen, 
2. high concentrations of heavy metals, and 
3. atmospheric gas supersaturation, as problems in discharges from 
hydroelectric impoundmep.ts, specifically requested EPA to "desig-
nate and set uniform effluent limitations for discharges." 
EPA has not yet taken action with respect to the NWF rulemaking petition. 
In South Cprolina Wildlife Federation v. Alexander 85 a district court 
denied a government motion to dismiss a s~it brought to require the Corps 
of Engineers -to obtain an NPDES permit: from EPA for the release of im-, .. 
pounded water through turbines in a federal hydroelectric dam. The court 
found that plaintiff's allegations that the dam causes downstream water 
pollution, if true, were a sufficient basis for EPA jurisdiction under section 
402. The court noted that release of impounded water, low in oxygen levels 
and high in dissolved metals because of impoundment, constituted the 
"addition" of pollutants to a navigable water. The court indicated that it 
could not hold as a matter of law that the dam and/or its turbines did not 
constitute point sources, noting that if plaintiffs made their case at trial, the 
project would be a point source: 
There was a significant volume of litigation in 1978 affecting the NPDES 
system. There are appeals pending in the Fifth and Tenth Circuits of district 
court decisions holding that· mine-related pollution such as leachate 
"_ F. supp. _.11 E.R.C. 2045 (D.S.C. 1978). 
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overflow, rainfall runoff, and drainage from mine pits constitutes non-
point source pollution and is outside the scope of the NPDES permit pro-
gram. 86 
In Inland Steel Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency87 the Seventh 
Circuit held that EPA has authority to issue NPDES permits with 
"reopener" provisions which require permit modification to renect toxic 
pollutant standards subsequently adopted under section 307(a). EPA's 
modification authority rests on section 402(b)(l)(C)(iii) which provides that 
the Administrator may issue permits that can be terminated or modified for 
cause including, but not limited to, a "change in any condition that requires 
either a temporary or permanent reduction or elimination of the permitted 
discharge." Section 402(k) does not, according to the court, insulate the 
permittee from a mid-term modification to reflect subsequent section 307(a) 
toxic standards, but rather ensures that the permittee will not be held in 
noncompliance with the new standards unless and until the permit is 
modified to include the new standards. EPA has subsequently relied on In-
land Steel as authority to issue NPDES permits with a reopener provision 
requiring permit modification to reflect effluent limitations and standards 
promulgated under sections 301 and 304 for "priority pollutants," as op-
posed to the toxic pollutant standards under section 307(a) that were at issue 
in Inland Steel. In addition EPA maintains that, upon modification to in-
corporate such subsequently promulgated limitations and standards, a per-
mittee may be forced to comply with all then applicable requirements of the 
CWA. 
In Niagara of Wisconsin Paper Corp. v. Wisconsin 88 the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court ruled that unexpire Wisconsin NPDES permits which incor-
porated effluent limitations based on EPA's interim regulations must be 
modified to reflect less stringent BPT limitations adopted by EPA in final 
regulations. State law provides that state permit effluent limitations may 
not exceed federal effluent limitations, and due process considerations re-
quire permit modifications to incorporate final effluent limitations pro-
mulgated under formal rulemaking procedures. 
In Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle 89 the First Circuit continued 
the line of cases holding that APA adjudicatory hearing requirements apply 
to section 402 proceedings and, in this case, to section 316(a) proceedings. 
In Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. United States90 a district court held that 
state issuance of an NPDES permit and EPA's lack of objection to that is-
suance do not constitute major federal action under NEP A. A similar issue 
"Sierra Club v. Abston Constitution Co., No. 77-2530 (5th Cir., appeal docketed July 28, 
1977); United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., Nos. 77-1302 and 77-1303 (lOth Cir., filed Mar. 
22, 1977). 
"574 F.2d 367, Il E.R.C. 1353 (7th Cir. 1978). 
"268 N.W.2d 153, Il E.R.C. 2024 (Wis. 1978). 
"572 F.2d 872, Il E.R.C. 1358 (1st Cir. 1978). 
"453 F. Supp. 122, 11 E.R.C. 1897 (E.D. Va. 1978). 
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is pending in litigation in the Tenth Circuit where NRDC is challenging the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's delegation of licensing authority to a 
state, arguing that NRC's involvement in the licensing procedure in New 
Mexico is, notwithstanding the delegation to the state, sufficient to con-
stitute major federal action so that impact statement requirements are not 
eliminated by the delegation. 91 
One recent case has dealt with EPA delegation of the NPDES program to 
states. In Central Hudson Gas and E/:!ctric v. Environmental Protection 
Agency92 the Second Circuit held that a court of appeals does not have 
jurisdiction under section 509(b)( 1 )(F) of the CW A to review EPA's reten-
tion of authority over those NPDES permits in adjudication at the time of 
delegation of the NPDES program to the state, since such EPA exercise of 
authority is not an agency decision to "issue or deny" permits. The court 
went on, however, to resolve the case on the merits, holding that EPA may 
maintain authority over permit proceedings on which adjudicatory hearings 
had been requested at the point of delegation, notwithstanding the language 
of section 402(c)(1) which directs EPA, once a state has taken over ad-
ministration of the NPDES program, to "suspend the issuance of permits." 
A number of decisions have continued the d~velopment of the law 
relating to EPA review and judicial review of state-issued NPDES permits. 
In Washington v. Environmental Protection Agency93 the Ninth Circuit 
held that EPA cannot base its objections to a state NPDES permit on in-
terim guidance documents. The court noted that exercise of the veto power 
is "contingent upon the antecedent formulation of guidelines regulations 
under section 304(b) in conformity with the rulemaking provisions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act." 
In Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. United States 94 a federal district court 
held that it had no jurisdiction over a citizen suit challenging the legality of 
the Virginia NPDES permit program and EPA approval of that program 
since section 509(b)(l) of the CWA gives exclusive jurisdiction to the courts 
of appeals over EPA approval of state programs. The court also held that it 
had no jurisdiction over an EPA failure to object to state issuance of an 
NPDES permit, citing previous cases to the same effect. The court said that 
EPA's right to object to an individual permit is "totally discretionary and 
can be waived completely." It found that the right to object had been 
"committed to Agency review," apparently meaning committed to agency 
"discretion," and thus found no jurisdiction with regard to these issues. 
"Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 12 E.R.C. 1306 
(10th Cir. 1978) (allowing private uranium mill operator to intervene in the litigation on 
grounds that operator's claimed interest in litigation would not be represented adequately by 
existing parties). See also Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle. 12 E.R.C. 1131 (D.D.C. 
1978) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss. noting that § 102(2)(E) is independent of and 
broader than the EIS requirement of § 102(2)(C) and does not fall within the prohibition of § 
511(c)(l». 
"_ F.2d _. 12 E.R.C. 1454 (2d Cir. 1978). 
"573 F.2d 583. 11 E.R.C. 1339 (9th Cir. 1978). 
"445 F. Supp. 1349, 11 E.R.C. 1475 (E.D. Va. 1978). 
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The court in Washington v. Environmental Protection Agency9S ruled 
that courts of appeals do not have jurisdiction under section 509(b)(1)(F) to 
review an EPA veto of a state-issued permit, noting that jurisdiction over 
such a veto lies in federal district court under section 10 of the APA. 
In Shell Oil v. Train 96 the court held that a district court lacks jurisdiction 
to review state issuance of an NPDES permit and the state's refusal to grant 
a BPT variance. Shell had not urged review of the EPA failure to veto the 
permit; rather, it had requested review of "affirmative action on the part of 
the Administrator in making or causing the Regional Board to make a deci-
sion against it. "97 In the words of the court, "In short, Shell's theory is that 
EPA 'coercions' transform the actions of the state agency into federal 
agency action reviewable in the federal court." Noting that "the Supreme 
Court has been "distinctly unwilling to view federal dealings with a state or 
state agency as evidencing either coercion or undue influence, "98 the court 
rejected Shell's arguments and noted that the existence of a state judicial 
forum for review of the state decision forecloses the availability of the 
federal forum under the APA. The court noted that "proper respect for 
both the integrity and independence of the state administrative mechanism, 
mandated by Congress in this context, required that Shell's complaint be 
dismissed. " 
Judge Wallace dissented, arguing that Shell's complaint alleged EPA ac-
tion "which is the functional equivalent of the formal veto in Washington 
v. EPA." He would therefore have allowed review of this functional veto in 
federal district court pursuant to section 10 of the AP A. 
Finally, in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Costle99 the Ninth Circuit held 
that an "extention" by EPA of an NPDES permit is an EPA action "issu-
ing or denying" a permit and thus is appealable under section 509(b)(I)(F) 
of the CWA. The court noted, however, that in its opinion a "modifica-
tion" of an EPA permit by EPA is not an "issuance or denial" and thus is 
not appealable under that section. The court seems to assume, without com-
ment, that modification of a permit (altering the meaning and scope of only 
those provisions modified, as opposed to an extension which affects all pro-
visions of a permit by projecting their life) is not appealable in a court of ap-
peals, but it does not indicate how or where such a modification is ap-
pealable. 
5. Section 404 Developm~nts 
In Parkview Corp. v. Department oj the ArmylOO a district court granted a 
preliminary Injunction preventing the Corps and municipai defendants 
"513 F.2d 583. 11 E.R.C. 1339 (9th Cir. 1918). 
"12 E.R.C. 1541 (9th Cir. 1918). 
97 [d. at 1550. 
"[d. 
"_ F.2d _. 11 E.R.C. 2125 (9th Cir. 1918). 
100 12 E.R.C. 1302 (E.D. Wis. 1918). 
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from removing fill, appurtenant structures, and other materials pending a 
hearing on the merits, after finding that a Corps compliance order requiring 
removal, purportedly issued under section 309 of the CW A, exceeded the 
Corps jurisdiction, since that section empowers only EPA to issue enforce-
ment orders. The court did not address the power 'of the court to issue such 
an order under section 404(s). The court also noted that the plaintiff had 
raised a substantial question as to whether the area in question was located 
within a wetlands area as defined by the Corps' own regulations. The plain-
tiff relied on a version of the Corps' regulations in force at the time the 
work in question was begun while the Corps relied on a newer version which 
became effective later. 
6. Section 5Jl(c)(2) Developments 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has been active recently in 
interpretation of its role in evaluating aquatic envionmental impacts when 
licensing nuclear power plants. In Public Service Company of New Hamp-
shire (Seabrook Station Units 1 and 2)'0' the NRC ruled that it would accept 
for purposes of its cost-benefit analyses when licensing nuclear power 
plants, without independent inquiry, the EPA determination as to the ap-
propriate cooling system and as to the nonradiological aquatic impacts 
associated with that cooling system. Subsequently, an Atomic Safety and 
Licensing Board and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board ruled 
that NRC permits cannot include nonradiological aquatic monitoring re-
quirements, on the grounds that such requirements overlap EPA's jurisdic-
tion under the CWA and are prohibited by section 511(c)(2) of the CWA 
which provides that no other federal agency shall, as a result of its NEPA 
jurisdiction, "impose ... any effluent limitation" other than one establish-
ed by EPA under the CW A. 102 
On November 16, 1978, the full Commission exercised its authority to 
review, on its own motion, a decision of the Atomic Safety and Licensing 
Appeal Board in the Indian Point case'03 in which the Appeal Board had 
bowed to staff demands that a May 1, 1982, closed-cycle cooling require-
ment be retained in the Indian Point licenses. The Appeal Board had re-
jected requests that this condition be deleted or that the date for closed-
cycle cooling be made indefinite pending final resolution by EPA under the 
NPDES system as to whether closed-cycle cooling is required or not. In 
taking up the matter, the NRC asked t.he parties to address two issues: (1) 
the implications of the Seabrook decision with respect to closed-cycle cool-
ing at Indian Point Unit No. 2 and existing termination date of May 1, 
'·'CLI 78-1, 7 N.R.C. 1 (1978). 
'·'Tennessee Valley Authority (Yellow Creek Nuclear Plant), LPB-7-87, 7 N.R.C. 215, 
231 (1978); Tennessee Valley Authority (Yellow Creek Nulear Plant), ALAB-515 (Dec. 27, 
1978). 
'·'ALAB-487, 8 N,R.C. 69 (1978). 
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1982, for once-through cooling; and (2) to what extent the Indian Point 
license condition imposing closed-cycle cooling should be modified to take 
proper account of EPA's authority. These issues have now been briefed and 
await disposition by the Commission. 
7. Enforcement 
EPA announced important new enforcement policy initiatives on April 11, 
1978.'°' 
There was considerable enforcement litigation under the CW A in 1978. 
South Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Alexanderlos held that EPA has a 
mandatory duty under section 309(a)(3) to issue a compliance order once it 
finds a violation of the CW A, but has no mandatory duty to bring a civil or 
criminal enforcement action in the courts. 
A number of cases deal with the effect of failure by EPA to take certain 
steps during the enforcement process. In United States v. City of Colorado 
Springsl06 the district court ruled that lack of 30-day notice to the city and 
state in accordance with section 309(a)(l) of the CW A does not entitle the 
city defendant to dismissal of federal enforcement action for alleged viola-
tions of its sewage treatment plant discharge permit, since EPA may pro-
ceed unilaterally to issue an administrative compliance order or to initiate a 
civil suit. In United States v. Hudson Farms 107 a district court ruled that 
failure to issue an abatement order under section}09(a)(3) does not entitle a 
defendant to dismissal of an indictment in a federal criminal action for 
alleged violations of the CW A, since the Administrator's duty to issue an 
administrative order or to initiate civil action, even if a mandatory duty, is 
not a prerequisite to bringing a criminal action. Similarly, in United States 
v. Frezzo Brothers, Inc. 108 another judge in the same district ruled that the 
issuance of an order or the institution of a civil suit by the Administrator is 
not a prerequisite to the filing of a criminal prosecution. The court also 
ruled that defendant could be guilty of a violation of section 301(a) of the 
CW A whether or not effluent standards applicable to the defendants had 
been set, since they acknowledged that they neither had a permit under sec-
tion 402 nor had they applied for one. 
In United States v. Outboard Marine Corp. 109 a district court rules that 
prior issuance of an administrative compliance order under section 
309(a)(3) of theCW A does not bar commencement of a civil action at a 
later point by the EPA under section 309(b). The court also noted that sec-
tion 402(k) does not provide immunity from liability under the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1899 for illegal discharges of polychlorinated biphenyls 
'·'For reprint of full text see 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2011-2020. 
,.,_ F. Supp. _.11 E.R.C. 2045 (D. S.C. 1978). 
'·'12 E.R.C. 1329 (D. Colo. 1978). 
'·'12 E.R.C. 1444 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
'·'12 E.R.C. 1481 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
'·'12 E.R.C. 1346 (N.D. Ill. 1978). 
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(PCBs) alleged to have occurred prior to the discharger's filing of an ap-
plication for a section 402 permit. Finally, the court held the complaint suf-
ficient in its allegation that the permit does not authorize Outboard Marine 
to discharge PCBs where defendant's permit application represented that 
no chlorinated hydrocarbons were contained in its discharge outfalls, and 
the permit, as issued, was based on those representations. The complaint is 
sufficient under those circumstances. The court held that defendant's 
NPDES permit does not constitute a defense unless defendant is in com-
pliance with it, a factual issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
In an anomalous decision, a district court in United States v. Velsicol 
Chemical Corp. "0 appeared to hold that Velsicol was guilty of discharging a 
pollutant to navigable water in violation of its NPDES permit where it 
discharged endrin and heptachlor to the city sewer system, but not directly 
to "waters of the United States." These discharges were in violation of the 
interim pretreatment standards for those pollutants set in its NPDES per-
mit. It is not clear why Velsicol held an NPDES permit in the first place, 
although perhaps it was because the court had previously entered an order 
on January 6, 1976, denying Velsicol's motion to dismiss in which VeJsicol 
argued that it discharged through the city system rather than directly into 
waters of the United States. In the present opinion, the court set a civil 
penalty of $30,000 for over 300 days of violation. 
8. Judicial Review Developments 
In Teneco Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency'" the court con-
strued the venue provisions of section 509, ruling that venue is proper in the 
Fifth Circuit for judicial review under section 509(b)(1)(F) of an EPA-
issued NPDES permit despite the fact that none of the oil companies involv-
ed resides within the Fifth Circuit, since each transacts business within the 
circuit. The court assumed that the venue provisions of section 509 will re-
quire, as does the general venue statute, that a corporation resides only at its 
place of incorporation. The companies argued, however, that each "trans-
acts such business" within the Fifth Circuit because its principal place of 
business is within the circuit. EPA argued that "transacts such business" 
refers only to operations directly affected by the Administrator's action, in 
this case the off-shore oil platforms for which permits had been issued, 
which were adjacent to areas outside the Fifth Circuit. 
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle'12 a district court 
ruled that NRDC was entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under section 
505 (d) of the CW A in the litigation which resulted in the settlement agree-
ment, noted earlier, concerning toxic pollutants, finding that the fees 
claimed were in accordance with the prevailing local rate. The court refused 
"°12 E.R.C. 1417 (W.O. Tenn. 1978). 
11112 E.R.C. 1076 (5th Cir. 1978). 
"'12 E.R.C. 1181 (D.D.C. 1978). 
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to allow NRDC attorneys' fees for opposing motions to intervene by third 
parties in the litigation since the government also opposed intervention and 
since award of attorneys' fees between nonadverse parties would contravene 
the purpose of section 505(b) to encourage efficient enforcement of the 
CW A. Third-party industries, who had successfully sought intervention as 
defendants, were not allowed attorneys' fees since award of attorneys' fees 
to voluntary intervenors would contravene the purpose of section 
505(b)-which was to reimburse only defendants victimized by harrassing 
and frivolous litigation. 
Finally, in Homestake Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection 
Agency"3 a mining company petition challenging EPA's denial of a request 
for modification of an NPDES permit was dismissed for a lack of jurisdic-
tion where it was filed more than 90 days after EPA's denial. The court 
essentially ruled that the 90-day period for review ran from date plaintiff's 
request for modification was denied by EPA, not the date five days later on 
which plaintiff received notice of the EPA decision. The court did not reach 
EPA's argument that the 90-day period ran from the date the permit was 
originally issued. EPA had argued that petitioner's request for modification 
was not based solely upon grounds which arose after the ninetieth day after 
the original permit issuance. 
Part II 
OTHER FEDERAL DEVELOPMENTS 
The pursuit of alternative energy sources received only sporadic encourage-
ment over the past year. Coal proponents have been buoyed by the Interior 
Department's move toward reopening the leasing of western federal coal 
lands with the issuance late in 1978 of a draft environmental impact state-
ment on a proposed new program for managing the production of such 
coal. The government has not generally leased tracts in the West since 1971. 
Even after these tracts are leased, however, the transportation of coal re-
mains a problem. Innovative proposals such as the coal slurry pipeline have 
not been favorably received. The House Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs reported H.R. 1609, the Coal Pipeline Act of 1978, to the full 
House for its consideration. The purpose was to facilitate the acquisition of 
rights-of-way by coal slurry pipeline carriers. By the use of pumps a coal 
slurry pipeline would carry large quantities of finely ground coal suspended 
"'12 E.R.C. 1335 (8th Cir. 1978). 
